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NOTE
Scared to Death: The Separate Right to
Counsel at Capital Sentencing
by JoHN E. SPOMER, III*
[F]ear brings back the primitive conception of the function of
courts; not necessarily, or indeed often, personal fear, but fear
of changes; fear on the part of the upholders of the old order;
fear of the effects of the discoveries of new truths; fear of emerg-
ing into the full light. Where such fear is justice cannot be; a
court becomes an instrument of power; judges are soldiers put-
ting down rebellion; a so-called trial is a punitive expedition or a
ceremonial execution-its victim a Bruno, a Galileo, or a
Dreyfus.'
I. Introduction
To many people, a defense lawyer is "a nettlesome obstacle to the
pursuit of wrongdoers."' And while some believe that a defense law-
yer has no proper role to play during pre-trial police-citizen en-
counters, such as interrogations and lineups, 3 the role of defense
counsel at trial and post-trial proceedings is less controversial: she
serves to safeguard an innocent party from wrongful conviction and to
ensure that the guilty receive due process.4
In our system of criminal jurisprudence, defense lawyers are "ne-
cessities, not luxuries."5 They serve as "potential equalizers" in the
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1. SIR JoHN MAcDONELL, msToRicAL TRIALS 86 (1929).
2. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. See JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRMUINAL PROCEDURE 509 (2d ed.
1997).
4. See id.
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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confrontation between the government's lawyer-whose role is to
prosecute-and the person charged with the offense.6 In sum, defense
lawyers are "an antidote to the fear, ignorance and bewilderment" felt
by the ordinary defendant.7
In a capital trial, where the crime charged is of the most notorious
kind, such as murder, it is particularly difficult for a defendant to re-
ceive a fair trial.8 Ignorance, hatred, and fear are the roots of the
dilemma in assuring a fair capital trial. First, there is the defendant's
ignorance of the rule of law and its importance to his prosecution and
possible defense. 9 There is also the public's fear of the accused and
their hatred of what he represents and what his asserted offense im-
plies.1° Consequently, defense counsel dreads "that the fear-engen-
dered hatred of the accused will" bear across to his advocate as well.11
Prejudices, such as these, threaten not only the justness of convic-
tion at the guilt phase of the trial, but they also effect the application
of the death penalty during the separate sentencing phase. Therefore,
in order to ensure a fair and accurate trial, it is imperative that the
accused be granted the necessary protections and due process af-
forded him by the Constitution. 2 Under the seminal case of Powell v.
Alabama,'3 the Supreme Court declared, albeit very narrowly, that a
defendant charged of a capital crime has a right to be represented by
counsel at trial. 4 In addition, the Court has suggested that the de-
fendant may also enjoy the right to counsel at the sentencing phase of
a capital trial.'
Today, under federal statute, the capital defendant not only has
the right to an attorney during trial, but he may be entitled to repre-
sentation by two attorneys. 6 However, this right is merely statutory.
The trial court is not required to advise the defendant of his right to
multiple counsel. 7 Moreover, even if the defendant is aware of this
statutory right, the decision to appoint multiple counsel lies solely
6. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 509.
7. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YAL
L.J. 1179, 1179 (1975).
8. See PETER E. KANE, MURDER, CouRTS, AND THE PREss 3-4 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
10. See generally SAMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LmERTES 76-86
(1999).
11. ELLIOT EVANs CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 13 (1963).
12. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Id. at 71.
15. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1967) (holding defendant has right to
counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding).
16. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3005 (West 1998).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir. 1976).
within the discretion of the trial court.18
These exceptions to the federal rule expose vulnerabilities within
the capital trial process, created by the ignorance and fear that
weaken the capital defendant's due process rights. For example, the
fact that the trial court does not have to inform the accused of their
right to multiple counsel plays upon the capital defendant's ignorance,
effectively undermining their right to counsel under Powell.19
However, it is the jury's fear of the hated defendant and the ensu-
ing hatred for the counsel who represents him during the guilt phase
of the trial, which require that a capital defendant possess a separate
right to counsel during the sentencing proceeding. If the defendant is
convicted at the guilt phase of his trial, his attorney's credibility will
come into question by the jury.20 If the same attorney represents the
defendant during the sentencing phase, the jury may become
prejudiced. They may say to themselves, "We didn't believe his argu-
ments during the trial, so why should we believe him now at
sentencing?"
To date, a separate right to counsel at the penalty phase of a capi-
tal trial is not recognized as fundamental under the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.2' This Note argues that a capital defendant has a
constitutional right to have a separate attorney represent him during
the sentencing stage. Part II examines the development of the right to
counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part III ana-
lyzes case law surrounding the application of the right to counsel to
the sentencing phase of a capital trial and statutes delegating the right
to multiple counsel. Finally, Part IV proposes that the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel provision guarantees a defendant a separate
right to counsel at the sentencing phase of a capital trial consistent
with the due process of law.
H. Evolution of the Right to Counsel at Capital Trials
A. Overview of the Capital Trial
The first documented execution on American soil took place
nearly 400 years ago, in 1608.22 Since that time, "the number of death
sentences and executions in U.S. history has been minimal compared
18. See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship, 548 F.2d 1118, 1121 (4th Cir. 1976).
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
20. See WELSH S. Win-r, THE DEATH PENALTY iN THE NINmTEs 77 (1991).
21. See, e.g., Grandison v. Maryland, 479 U.S. 873 (1986) (mem.) (Marshall & Bren-
nan, JJ., dissenting as to the Court's denial of the petitioner's writ of certiorari).
22. See V. Schneider and J. Smykla, A Summary Analysis of Executions in the United
States, 1608-1987: The Espy File, in THE DEATH PENALTY iN AMERICA: CuRRENwr RE-
SEARCH 1, 6 (R. Bohm ed., 1991).
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to the number of murders."'  Defendants convicted of murder are
rarely executed, and less than 10% of capital homicides result in ex-
ecutions. 4 However, there has been a dramatic rise in the rate of
executions this decade.' Specifically, in 1996, there were more pris-
oners on death row (more than 2,800) than at any time in U.S. his-
tory.26 The number of death row executions increased from 14 in 1991
to 68 in 1998.27 As of January 1, 1999, the number of prisoners on
death row increased to a record 3,549 people.' Approximately 250
people are added to death row each year,2 9 and the U.S. Supreme
Court continually rejects legal challenges to the death penalty. 0
When a defendant is charged with a capital crime such as murder,
a capital trial ensues. The structure of American capital jurisprudence
is unique in several respects. For example, capital trials are bifurcated
into a guilt phase and a separate sentencing phase. If a defendant is
found guilty at the first phase, a sentence is selected at the sentencing,
or "penalty," phase. During the sentencing phase, "jurors hear testi-
mony pertaining to aggravating and mitigating factors that bear on the
circumstances of the offense or the character of the offender .... In
all but seven states, the jury makes the final sentencing decision."'"
Most states allow the jury to pronounce a verdict of death "only if
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. '32
B. History of the Right to Counsel at Capital Trials
A defendant's right to counsel at a capital trial is rooted in the
U.S. Constitution.33 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[in] all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
23. Mark Costanzo and Lawrence T. White, An Overview of the Death Penalty and
Capital Trials: History, Current Status, Legal Procedures and Cost, in 1 CAPrrAL PUNISH-
MENT: THE PHILOSOPFICAL, MORAL AND PENOLOGICAL DEBATE OVER CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 331, 333 (Margery B. Koosed ed., 1996).
24. See id.
25. See id at 334-35.
26. See id. at 335.
27. See Death Row Executions (visited Mar. 2, 1999) <http://www.smu.edu/-deathpen/
execyrstl.html>.
28. See Prisoners on Death Row (visited Mar. 2, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic
dpic5.html>.
29. See K.C. Haas & J.A. Inciardi, Lingering Doubts about a Popular Punishment, in
CHALLENGING CAPITAL PuNis-msEN 11, 12 (K.C. Haas and J.A. Inciardi eds. 1988).
30. See J.R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Cour4 Empirical Research Evi-
dence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 L. & Soc'y REv. 65, 65-88 (1993).
31. Costanzo and White, supra note 23, at 338. In Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Ne-
braska, the judge alone makes the sentencing decision. See id. In Alabama, Delaware,
Florida and Indiana, the judge may override a jury's sentencing recommendation. See id
32. Id.
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Assistance of Counsel for his defense."34 This right is fundamental
and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause. 5
1. Development of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Because many elements of the United States' substantive and
procedural law have their roots in English common law, it may be
assumed that there were precedents in early English law concerning
the right to counsel in criminal cases.3 6 However, this is not the case.
Under English law, a felony defendant was not legally entitled to re-
tain counsel, even though misdemeanor defendants "had a right as
broad as that extended in civil litigation. 37 In fact, persons charged
with felonies were not permitted counsel until 1836.38
The right to counsel in the American colonies differed from the
right of their English ancestors in certain respects. Instead of relegat-
ing the issue to judicial discretion, the general rule provided for some
form of colonial statutory protection.39 Connecticut fully surpassed
the English custom by providing for court appointed counsel in all
cases where the accused needed and could not retain counsel.40 Other
colonies, such as Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Delaware, went
halfway, stating that in capital cases the accused should have counsel
upon request.41 Based on these examples, "[there seems] to have
been a greater awareness in American courts that an [unrepresented
defendant] was at a serious disadvantage, and this awareness became
keener as the number of lawyers increased in colonial America."'42
"After the Revolution, most states included a clause respecting [the
right to] counsel in their constitutions.' 43
Available legislative history of the Sixth Amendment indicates
that no comment or controversy accompanied its Congressional pro-
posal or the subsequent state ratifying conventions.' However, a
Congress composed of many of the Framers of the Constitution
passed two legislative acts, which illuminate the Framers' conception
34. lI-
35. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 345 (1963). See also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
36. See WiiLAm M. BEANEY, THE IGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8
(1955).
37. Id at 24.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 25.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 27.
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of the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.'
First, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the following clause was in-
serted the day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed by Con-
gress: "In all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead
and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such
counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts... and
shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."46 If Con-
gress believed that the right to counsel provision under the proposed
Sixth Amendment greatly deviated from this statutory rule, some dis-
cussion concerning the proposal most likely would have occurred on
the floor.47
The second insight into the meaning of the Sixth Amendment
comes from a congressional act of April 30, 1790, passed seven months
before the ratification of the Sixth Amendment, stating:
Any person who shall be indicted of treason... [or] other capi-
tal crime shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel
learned in the law; and the court before whom such person shall
be tried, or some judge thereof, shall ... immediately upon his
request to assign to him such counsel, not exceeding two, as such
person shall, to whom such counsel desire, and they shall have
free access at all seasonable hours.' 8
Despite the proposed Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel
in all felony cases, Congress passed the Act of April 30, 1790 to mimic
the English treason act of 1695 and to also include all capital cases.49
The act also "placed the right to counsel in federal courts on the same
plane as statutes had placed the right to counsel in the state courts of
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, where the constitutions
merely gave the right 'to be heard by counsel."'5 0
The ratification of the Sixth Amendment was not followed by
statutory changes, and the acts of 1789 and 1790 remained the dual
guideposts marking the legal meaning of the Sixth Amendment until
1938.1 In 1938, the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. Zerbst52 that
the "Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life
or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.""3 How-
ever, in reaching its Sixth Amendment decision, the Court skirted the
45. See id at 28.
46. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
47. See BEANEY, supra note 36, at 28
48. Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 118 (1790) (emphasis added).
49. See BEANEY, supra note 36, at 28.
50. Id.
51. See id
52. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
53. Id. at 463.
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problem of historical analysis in dealing with the amendment's coun-
sel provision." This is in stark contrast to the Court's extensive his-
torical discussions of the Sixth Amendment in Powell v. Alabama55
and Betts v. Brady,56 where the Fourteenth Amendment due process
requirement of counsel was at issue.
The waiver rule established in Zerbst is a reliable indicator of the
strength of the Sixth Amendment. According to Zerbst, the constitu-
tional right to counsel may not be waived unless there is "an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."57 The validity of a waiver is based on the totality of the
circumstances of the case,58 and the court will "indulge every reason-
able presumption against waiver."5 9
2. The birth of due process and the right to counsel in Powell v.
Alabama.
In 1932, Justice George Sutherland, writing for the Supreme
Court in the watershed case of Powell v. Alabama,60 stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law .... He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evi-
dence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmis-
sible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to es-
tablish his innocence.6 1
In Powell, nine black teenagers were prosecuted for the alleged
rape of two white girls in an Alabama community. The Court de-
scribed the youths as "ignorant and illiterate."'62 Moreover, they were
residents of another state, and they were brought to trial less than two
weeks after the capital offenses allegedly occurred.63 No lawyer had
54. See id. at 464-65.
55. 287 U.S. at 60-68 (1932).
56. 316 U.S. 455, 465-71 (1942).
57. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
58. See id.
59. Id (emphasis added).
60. 287 U.S. 45.
61. Id at 68-69.
62. Id at 52.
63. See id. at 52-53.
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been designated to represent the defendants.' On the day of the
trial, two lawyers, one of whom was from out of state and unfamiliar
with local law, offered to represent the youths.65 The lawyers were
denied a continuance so that they could adequately prepare their de-
fense.66 Eight of the defendants were convicted in the three one-day
trials that followed and were sentenced to death.67
"After affirmance of the conviction by the Supreme Court of Al-
abama, an appeal was taken on the ground the defendants had been
denied due process of law."6 8 The lawyers representing the accused
"devoted the first half of their brief to a statement of the facts .... the
swift course of events, the hostility of the community with its effect on
the jurors, the trial judge, and evidently the local lawyers, and the lack
of a vigorous and sustained defense."69 "Though their statement of
facts was impressive, the lawyers for the accused were uncertain as to
the precise ground of relief under the due process clause of the Con-
stitution of the United States, and in their brief they gave the right to
counsel the inconspicuous second place" among the three grounds
urged.70
Putting aside the other grounds, Justice Sutherland seized upon
and declared the right to counsel.71 Relying on defense counsel's
statement of facts, Justice Sutherland laid down three separate
grounds which supported a defendant's right to counsel. First, there is
the character of the right to counsel: "[T]he right involved is of such
character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamen-
tal principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions.' '7 2 Next, there are the two methods by
which the right may be satisfied: (1) "reasonable time and opportu-
nity to secure counsel" of the defendant's choice, and, (2) when the
defendant cannot personally obtain counsel, "an effective appoint-
ment of counsel" by the trial court itself.73 Finally, there is the atti-
tude of counsel which gives meaning to the right: counsel should have
a "clear appreciation of responsibility or be impressed with that indi-
vidual sense of duty."'74
64. See iL at 49.
65. See id. at 53-54.
66. See id. at 53-57.
67. See id. at 49-50.
68. CHEATHAm, supra note 11, at 8.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Powell, 287 U.S. at 67 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1925)).
73. Id at 71.
74. Id. at 56.
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Powell's holding was extremely narrow. It was limited to the spe-
cial circumstances involving capital trials where the accused faced the
possibility of the death penalty.7' However, its narrow holding guar-
anteed capital defendants the right to counsel in federal cases under
the Sixth Amendment, empowered by those "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice"76 which constitute due process. Justice Suther-
land declared that the right to counsel had always been protected in
the United States as part of a hearing, referring back to the pre-Sixth
Amendment statutes of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the act of April
30, 1790.77 He stressed that "in a capital case, where the defendant is
unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his
own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or
the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law."'78
3. What is due process?
The concept of due process, on which Sutherland relies, is an
amorphous one. According to Beaney, "The expression originated as
a statutory phrase in 1355: 'No man of what state or condition he be,
shall be put out of his lands or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned,
nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by
due process of law.' ,,79 Beaney further explains: "[It held the] same
meaning as the earlier phrase 'law of the land' found in Section 39 of
Magna Carta, in 1225. Both signified that certain established modes
of trial were to be followed. Without opposition, it was included in
the Fifth Amendment."8 "
In Powell, Justice Sutherland cites in support of due process Jus-
tice Brown's opinion in Holden v. Hardy,"' stating that there are "cer-
tain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard. 82
The potency of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
was strengthened in the 1930s with the influential support of Justices
Benjamin Cardozo and Felix Frankfurter.83 Both Justices supported
75. See iL at 71.
76. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
77. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 62-64.
78. Id. at 71.
79. BEANEY, supra note 36, at 142 (quoting 20 Edw. 3, c. 3, cited in E.S. CoRwiN,
LmERTY AGAINST GovERNmENr 91 (1948)).
80. Id.
81. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 68 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)).
82. Id.
83. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 43.
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the doctrine of "fundamental rights."' The essence of this doctrine is
that the Fourteenth Amendment: "neither comprehends the specific
provisions by which the founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the
federal government nor is it confined to them. The Due Process
Clause ... has an independent potency ... "85 According to Justice
Frankfurter, "the due process clause did not incorporate, as such, any
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights."'8 6 Instead, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause requires that states honor "'princi-
ple[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and consciences of our peo-
ple as to be ranked as fundamental"' s  These "basic principles of
fundamental fairness and ordered liberty might indeed happen to
overlap wholly or in part with some of the rules of the Bill of Rights,
but [they] bear no logical relationship to those rules.""8
Over the years, the Supreme Court has articulated various tests
by which "fundamentalness" is determined. 9 For example, a right is
fundamental if: it is "of the very essence of a scheme of 'ordered lib-
erty;"' 90 a "fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without [it];"'" it is "at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions;" 92 its denial would "offend those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking people;"9 it
is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice; ' 94 or conduct in
derogation of the right "shocks the conscience." 95
Today, in the realm of criminal procedure, all but two provisions
of the Bill of Rights apply to the states via this "fundamental rights"
application of due process.96 In addition, the Supreme Court has rec-
84. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166-74 (1952); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 59-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
85. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
86. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 43.
87. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))
(emphasis added).
88. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1196 (1992).
89. See generally the cases cited at note 84, supra.
90. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at
325).
91. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
92. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
93. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
94. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
95. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
96. The exceptions are the Fifth Amendment provision that no person shall be held to
answer for a serious crime except by indictment or presentment of a grand jury, Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884), and the Eighth Amendment "no excessive bail"
provision, U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the "fundamen-
tal rights" status of the latter provision.
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ognized rights not enumerated in the Constitution, such as the right to
privacy and the right to marry, as being deemed fundamental and,
thus, protected by due process.
97
4. The development of the right to counsel and due process.
On the heels of Powell, the Court was invited, in Betts v. Brady,98
to announce that there is a per se constitutional right to appointed
counsel.99 The Court did not accept the invitation."' ° Instead, it re-
jected the principle that due process requires that an indigent defend-
ant receive counsel in every criminal case.10' The Court concluded
that the right to counsel was not fundamental to a fair trial, consider-
ing the "common understanding of those who have lived under the
Anglo-American system of law."'" Instead, the Court "applied the
'special circumstances' standard used in Powell" and "concluded that
no circumstances existed in the present case to justify the appointment
of counsel."'' 0
It was 21 years until Gideon v. Wainwright °4 overturned Betts. 05
In sum, Gideon brought the protections of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.10 6 In Gideon, the defendant was prosecuted for the felony of
breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misde-
meanor.'0 7 The defendant requested, but was denied, the assistance
of counsel.10 8 According to the Supreme Court, he conducted his own
defense "about as well as could be expected from a layman."'0 9
Nonetheless, the jury convicted him and he was sentenced to five
years' imprisonment. 10
The Court overturned the conviction."' Writing for the majority,
Justice Hugo Black stated that the Court in Betts had "made an abrupt
break with its own well-considered precedents," especially that of
97. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (establishing the right to marry or not
to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (establishing the right to en-
joy a zone of privacy).
98. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
99. See id. at 462-63.
100. See i&
101. See id. at 473.
102. Id. at 464.
103. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 514.
104. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
105. See id. at 345.
106. See id at 367.
107. See id. at 336-37.
108. See id. at 337.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See hi at 345.
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Powell.1 2 Black described as an "obvious truth" the fact that "in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless coun-
sel is provided for him.""' 3 He also observed:
Governments ... quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Law-
yers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect
the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are
few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their de-
fenses. [The implication of this is] . . . that lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental... in some
countries, but it is in ours." 4
The defendant was retried, but this time with the assistance of coun-
sel." 5 The jury returned a not guilty verdict in one hour."16
Many of the major Supreme Court "right to counsel" decisions,
post-Gideon, have focused on misdemeanor cases rather than capital
trials." 7 Most notably, the Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin"
8
that the Sixth Amendment requires that an indigent criminal defend-
ant may not be sentenced to imprisonment unless the State has af-
forded him the right to counsel in his defense." 9
Il. The Current Status of the Right to Counsel at
Capital Trials
In the context of capital trials, it is clear that Powell gives the
accused the right to counsel, under the Sixth Amendment in federal
courts, and this right is made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, as announced in Gideon.'21 In 1967, the
Court unfolded the constitutional origami further in Mempa v.
Rhay,'21 when it held that the right to counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments applies at all stages of a criminal prosecution
where "substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.'
' 22
112. Id. at 344.
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See ANTHONY LEwis, GIDEON's TRUMET 226-37 (1964).
116. See id. at 237.
117. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 37.
120. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-45.
121. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
122. Id. at 134.
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Likewise, today, the American Bar Association has declared that
its objective for the Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases is "to ensure that quality legal rep-
resentation is afforded to defendants eligible for the appointment of
counsel during all stages of the case."" This declaration of the right
to counsel in capital trials not only accurately reflects the right to
counsel provisions of the modem individual state constitutions, but it
is an accurate summary of the evolution of the right to counsel under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A. Application of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel to the
Sentencing Phase of the Capital Trial
In Mempa v. Rhay, 24 the Court held that the right to counsel
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments applies at all stages of a
criminal prosecution where "substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected."'" In recognizing this absolute right, the Court sug-
gested, but did not hold, that the sentencing proceeding of a criminal
trial is also guarded by the right to counsel. 26 Many lower courts
have since concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ap-
plies at sentencing. 27 In addition, the Supreme Court has also held in
Strickland v. Washington'" that due process requires effective assist-
ance of counsel at the sentencing phase of a capital trial.'2 9
1. The bifurcated nature of the capital trial.
The need for counsel is greater in capital cases than it is in other
cases. "A capital trial is, in substance, two separate trials: the guilty/
not guilty trial and the penalty trial."'130 Therefore, trial counsel in
capital cases must prepare not just for the guilt phase, as in other
cases, but also for the separate sentencing phase, at which the defense
is entitled to present any mitigating evidence with respect to punish-
ment. The Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,'3' explained that the
bifurcated system is more likely to eliminate constitutional abuses
when "a human life is at stake and when the jury must have informa-
123. ABA GUIDELINES FOR TnE APPOnqTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES § 1.1 (1989) (emphasis added).
124. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
125. See iL at 134.
126. See id.
127. See, e.g., Braun v. Rhay, 416 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Cortez, 6 Cal. 3d 78,
88 (1971); Machwat v. State, 222 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Fitch 269
N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
128. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
129. See id at 686-87.
130. ABA GumElNES, supra note 123, at § 1.1 (Commentary).
131. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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tion prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of
penalty in order to impose a rational sentence."' 32
In many capital cases, no credible argument for innocence ex-
ists, so ... the.., issue of punishment is the real focus of the
entire case. The Constitution requires individualization of the
capital sentencing process. A capital defendant has the right to
present his or her sentencer with any mitigating evidence that
might save his or her life. Therefore, defense counsel should be
aware of methods [which] effectively advocate for the life of the
client. 33
2. Unique characteristics of the sentencing phase.
Before determining whether the right to counsel applies sepa-
rately to the sentencing phase, it is important to understand why this
phase of a capital trial is considered a separate proceeding apart from
the guilt phase. First, both the prosecution and defense may support
their case with a much broader range of evidence at sentencing.
"[T]he government is free to offer any evidence relevant to a statuto-
rily defined aggravating circumstance.' 34 "[T]he defense is permitted
to present evidence that is relevant not only to a statutorily defined
mitigating circumstance but also to any circumstance the defense
claims is mitigating.' 35 Assuming, of course, that the parties take ad-
vantage of these opportunities, sentencing provides the jury with a
more complete exposure to the committed offense and the personal
characteristics of the offender. In the Supreme Court's view, the pres-
entation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances will lead to the
imposition of death sentences that are more accurate because they are
based on a more complete evaluation of relevant information. 36 Fur-
thermore, evidentiary rulings occurring in the guilt phase based upon
concerns such as relevancy and hearsay do not have automatic appli-
cation to the separate sentencing phase.'
37
Besides evidentiary differences, sentencing may be decided by a
jury different from the one that decided the guilt phase.' 38 In these
situations, the court may empanel a "nondeath-qualified" jury and try
the case as to the issue of guilt, and empanel a separate "death-quali-
fied" jury to hear the sentencing phase.' 9 Some courts have found
132. Id. at 191-92.
133. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 123, at § 1.1 (Commentary).
134. Id. at 74.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Evans v. Nevada, 926 P.2d 265, 282 (Nev. 1996).
138. See New Jersey v. Monturi, 478 A.2d 1266, 1269 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984); see also
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986) (rejecting a challenge to the current practice of
death-qualifying a jury in capital cases before the guilt phase of the trial).
139. See Monturi, 478 A.2d at 1269-70.
justification for a separate "death-qualified" jury within the Sixth
Amendment and the right to an impartial jury trial. 4 ° In addition to
Sixth Amendment arguments, at least one lower court has declared
that concepts of "due process, fundamental fairness and judicial econ-
omy permit the court to declare before the guilt phase.., that a non
'death-qualified' jury will be empanelled to hear the guilt phase and a
separate 'death-qualified' jury will be empanelled to hear the penalty
phase.' 141
3. Difficulties posed by the bifurcated structure.
However, the most significant mistakes made by attorneys in cap-
ital cases are based on misunderstandings regarding the highly com-
plex bifurcated trial.142 Many lawyers focus solely on the guilt phase
and neglect to prepare for the crucial sentencing phase, even though
there may be little hope of avoiding conviction but a substantial possi-
bility of avoiding imposition of the death penalty.143 Indeed, defense
lawyers who handle capital cases agree that the presentation of evi-
dence of mitigating circumstances at sentencing "often results in
sentences less than death."'"
To further complicate matters, court-appointed private attorneys
in capital cases are so poorly compensated for their services that they
are uneager to represent their clients vigorously. For example, in the
Supreme Court, the Justices only recently increased from $2,500 to
$5,000 the cap on compensation of lawyers appointed to represent in-
digent capital defendants before the high court.145 A defense attor-
ney, discouraged by being under-compensated, may be more inclined
to "quit" on his client's case after a guilty verdict is announced and
not vigorously prepare a sentencing argument which could save his
client's life.
The results of an attorney's neglect to prepare for the sentencing
phase are devastating. For example, in 1984, Johnny Taylor was exe-
cuted in Louisiana after his attorney failed "to adduce any testimony
or to make any argument to the jury at the sentencing stage.' 46 In
1986, Daniel Thomas was executed in Florida after his attorney made
a strategic choice not to present any background information relating
to the defendant but rather "to remain consistent in the eyes of the
140. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1313 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
141. Monturi, 478 A.2d at 1270 (emphasis added).
142. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and
Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L. Rv. 59, 73 (1989).
143. See id
144. Stephen S. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1865 (1994).
145. See In re Berger, 498 U.S. 233, 236 (1991).
146. Taylor v. Maggio, 727 F.2d 341, 349 n.10 (4th Cir. 1984).
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jury by continuing his guilt phase strategy of appealing to the concept
of reasonable doubt that Thomas had committed the crimes rather
than trying to play on the jury's sympathy."' 4 7 As one commentator
suggested, death sentences are doled out in capital cases "not for the
worst crime[s] but for the worst lawyer[s]."' 48
Experienced capital defense attorneys agree that the problem
identified by Thomas' counsel is a crucial one.' 49 A defense attorney
must consider whether he will appear consistent in front of the jury.150
Like Thomas' attorney, many defense lawyers are so short-sighted
during the guilt phase that they make arguments which are completely
inconsistent with their subsequent arguments in the penalty phase.' 5 '
This inconsistency can fatally undermine the defense attorney's credi-
bility before jurors. For example, if an attorney argues at the guilt
phase that her client is innocent and then, at the penalty phase, has
the defendant testify that he committed the offense and is sorry, she
will lose credibility with the jury.'52 The jury, already motivated by its
fear and vengeance towards the convicted defendant, is further re-
pulsed by the defense counsel, who was defeated in the guilt phase
and now lacks any credibility needed to effectively represent her cli-
ent. Given this scenario, the right to counsel at the penalty phase
takes on a vital significance.
4. Application of constitutional protections to the sentencing phase.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a defend-
ant's separate right to counsel during the sentencing phase of a capital
trial, the Court has applied other constitutional protections to the bi-
furcated sentencing procedure.
In Bullington v. Missouri,'53 the defendant was indicted for capi-
tal murder in Missouri.'5 4 At the guilt phase of the defendant's trial,
the jury returned a verdict of guilty.' 55  After the following
presentence hearing, the jury returned its additional verdict, which
sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.' 56 The defendant then
moved, on various grounds, for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alter-
native, for a new trial.'
147. Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 746 (11th Cir. 1985).
148. Bright, supra note 144, at 1864.
149. See WHrrE, supra note 20, at 77.
150. See id
151. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 142, at 257.
152. See Wnr-n, supra note 20, at 77.
153. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
154. See id. at 435.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 435-36.
157. See id. at 436.
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When the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new
trial, the prosecution served and filed notice, stating that once again it
would seek the death penalty and specifying the same aggravating cir-
cumstances the state sought to prove at the first trial.'58 The defense
moved to strike the notice, arguing that the double jeopardy clause of
the Fifth Amendment barred the imposition of the death penalty
when the first jury had declined to impose the death sentence.' 59
The Supreme Court held that the protection afforded by the
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to a person acquitted
by a jury was available to a person convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment, with respect to the death penalty, at
his retrial. 16° The Court reached this conclusion because it found that
a sentencing hearing is like a separate trial.16 ' Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun declared: "The presentence hearing resembled and,
indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue
of punishment ....,162
In Mempa v. Rhay,63 the defendant pleaded guilty, on the advise
of court-appointed counsel, to the offense of "joyriding."'" The de-
fendant was given a deferred sentence and placed on probation. 65
During his probation, he was charged with a burglary. 66 At a subse-
quent hearing, the defendant "was not represented by counsel and
was not asked whether he wished to have counsel appointed for
him."' 67 "Nor was any inquiry made [concerning] the appointed
counsel who had previously represented him.' 6 8 The court revoked
the defendant's probation and sentenced him to ten years' imprison-
ment.' 69 The defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he
had been deprived of his right to counsel at the proceeding where his
probation was revoked and sentence imposed. 70
The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's sentence and held
that the "appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every
stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal
158. See iL
159. See id.
160. See id. at 446.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
163. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
164. See id at 130.
165. See id.
166. See id at 130-31.
167. Id. at 131.
168. Id.
169. See kL
170. See iL
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accused may be affected."17 In support of its conclusion, the Court
cited Townsend v. Burke, 72 where it found that the absence of counsel
during sentencing after a plea of guilty, coupled with "assumptions
concerning his criminal record that were materially untrue," deprived
the defendant of due process. 73 The Mempa Court stated that Town-
send now "might well be considered to support by itself a holding that
the [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel applies to sentencing,"' 74 and
a number of lower courts have so held. 75
However, this holding has not been directly construed as to guar-
antee a defendant, during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Instead, it has been lim-
ited to guarantee a criminal defendant the right to "effective assist-
ance" of counsel at any stage of the trial where the accused's rights
may be affected.176
Since Mempa, the Court has continued to assemble the constitu-
tional tools necessary to forge a separate right to counsel at capital
sentencing under the Sixth Amendment. In Gardner v. Florida,177 for
example, the Court not only affirmed that the sentencing process of a
capital trial guaranteed the defendant the right to effective assistance
of counsel, but it also held that this sentencing phase must comply
with due process, just as the guilt phase, because it is a critical stage of
the proceeding.178 Since Gardner, the Supreme Court has held that
the imposition of the death penalty, where the state has given notice
that it will not recommend death, is a violation of due process. 79 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that a capital defendant, pro se or
not, has a due process right to speak at sentencing. 80 Other courts
have also held that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine witnesses
at the penalty phase in accordance with due process. 8'
B. The Statutory Right to Multiple Counsel at Capital Trials
1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3005 and ABA Guideline 2.1.
"The need for properly funded, competent counsel is greater in
capital cases than in other cases."' 82 The defense counsel must not
171. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
172. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
173. Id. at 741.
174. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134.
175. See generally cases cited in note 127, supra.
176. See Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1209 (11th Cir. 1996).
177. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
178. See id. at 358.
179. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127 (1991).
180. See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992).
181. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1255 (11th Cir. 1982).
182. Tabak & Lane, supra note 142, at 70.
only prepare for the guilt phase, as in other cases, but also for the
separate sentencing phase. 18 3 However, "due to lack of support staff
and time, most attorneys handling capital cases.., are unable to [un-
dertake] the comprehensive investigations necessary to effectively
represent the defendant at what are essentially two trials."''" These
problems are compounded by the racial, cultural, and class differences
between such attorneys and their clients. 8 Under these typically ad-
verse circumstances, defense counsel in capital cases may fail to ag-
gressively plea bargain and get their clients to accept reasonable offers
of life sentences.' 86 Consequently, "[i]n some cases, death penalties
will result although no one-prosecutor, judge, or even jury-really
wants the defendant to be executed."'"
In recognizing the finality of capital punishment, Congress
adopted a two-counsel provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3005. This provi-
sion declares in relevant part:
Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be
allowed to make his full defense by counsel; and the court
before which the defendant is to be tried, or a judge thereof,
shall promptly, upon the defendant's request, assign 2 such
counsel, of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the law applicable
to capital cases, and who shall have free access to the accused at
all reasonable hours.' 88
Although there is no legislative history as to why Congress
adopted the provision or has continued it in force, the Seventh Circuit,
in United States v. Shepard,89 has inferred two "humane" reasons be-
hind the statute. 90 First, the court declared that the purpose of the
two-counsel provision was to "reduce the chance that an innocent de-
fendant would be put to death because of inadvertence or errors in
judgment of his counsel."'191 Second, the court reasoned that the pro-
vision of multiple counsel was an "attempt to prevent mistakes that
would be irrevocable because of the finality of the punishment."'" In
light of these reasons, the two-counsel provision under section 3005 is
designed to protect a capital defendant from the mistakes made by his
own counsel.
The ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases have also declared that in capital
183. See id.
184. Id. at 70-71.
185. See id. at 71.
186. See id. at 72.
187. Id.
188. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3005 (West 1998) (emphasis added).
189. 576 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1978).
190. Id. at 728.
191. Id. at 729.
192. Id.
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cases "two qualified trial attorneys should be assigned to represent the
defendant."' 93 In addition to the aforementioned purposes of section
3005 above, the ABA also supports two other reasons behind the right
to multiple counsel. First, "the duties of defense counsel in capital
cases are definably different from those performed by counsel in
[other] criminal cases."'19 4 Second, there are many rapid develop-
ments in the complex body of law affecting death penalty cases.
195
Both of these factors focus upon the defense attorney's knowl-
edge of the capital trial process and death penalty law. The phrase
"two heads are better than one" fits appropriately in this context. For
in the increasingly complex field of capital litigation, where a single
mistake in legal judgment may result in the defendant's death, it is
critical that each decision by a defense attorney is capable of being
checked by the legal knowledge of another attorney so as to safeguard
against any fatal and irreversible error at trial. In addition, the two-
counsel provision allows both attorneys to split the trial in half,
whereby one attorney would try the guilt phase and, if the defendant
is found guilty, the second attorney would argue the sentencing phase.
Therefore, ABA Guideline 2.1 ensures that a capital defendant will
have sufficient quality and quantity of representation so as to prepare
an adequate defense at trial. 96
2. Difficulties in associating the right to multiple counsel with a
separate right to counsel at sentencing.
Although the multiple counsel provisions of both section 3005
and ABA Guideline 2.1 can be read with the quixotic notion that a
capital defendant has a separate right to counsel at sentencing, there
are several reasons why this is not the case.
Under section 3005, the courts have limited the statutory right to
multiple counsel in capital cases. First, the Fourth Circuit, in United
States v. Williams, 97 has determined that a court is not required to call
the two-counsel right to the attention of the defendant because the
right is merely statutory.' 98 Several other federal courts have held
likewise.' 99 Consequently, the court presumes a waiver of section
3005 unless it is clearly requested2 00 This ease in waiver is in severe
193. ABA GuiDErLNEs, supra note 123, at § 2.1.
194. Id. at § 2.1 (Commentary).
195. See id.
196. See iL
197. 544 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
198. See id at 1218.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship, 548 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1976); Harried v.
United States, 389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Barkan v. United States, 305 F.2d 774 (7th
Cir. 1962); United States v. Morris, 178 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
200. See Williams, 544 F.2d at 1219.
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contrast to waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, where
the defendant can only waive her constitutional right if it passes the
exacting "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" waiver test set out
in Johnson v. Zerbst.2°1 Second, even if the capital defendant invokes
her two-counsel right, the ultimate decision to appoint additional
counsel is within the discretion of the trial court.202 Hence, there is no
guarantee that, even if a defendant exercises her statutory right, she
will be able to invoke it.
Even if the trial court grants her additional counsel, as section
3005 makes clear, only one of the two counsel must be "learned in the
law applicable to capital cases. '2°3 This provision reinforces a defend-
ant's constitutional right to sufficient quality of legal representation by
providing a co-counsel who is expected to assist lead counsel in the
heavy responsibilities of preparing for both the guilt and sentencing
phases. However, co-counsel is not expected to emerge from his
shadow at the sentencing phase to solely represent the convicted de-
fendant because he is not required to be "learned in the law" of capi-
tal cases. He is there merely as a legal sidekick.
Likewise, the ABA suggests that "one of the two attorneys at
each stage should be designated and act as the lead counsel, while the
other is [designated] as co-counsel. ' '"2° If only one attorney is exper-
ienced in capital cases, as required under section 3005, the lead coun-
sel at the guilt phase must also be the lead counsel in the sentencing
phase. The alternative is that the co-counsel, inexperienced and una-
ware of the intricacies of a capital trial, is left as inadequate substitute
as lead counsel at either the guilt or sentencing phase.
The limitations of section 3005 and ABA Guideline 2.1 strip a
capital defendant of any guarantee to a separate attorney during the
sentencing trial. As a federal statute or a legal guideline, neither are
equipped to carry the weight of a separate right to counsel by itself.
IV. A Proposal: The Separate Right to Counsel at Capital
Sentencing Within the Sixth Amendment & Due
Process Clause
A. Grandison v. Maryland
In Grandison v. Maryland,°5 the defendant, Mr. Grandison, was
201. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
202. See Blankenship, 548 F.2d at 1121.
203. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3005 (West 1997).
204. ABA GumELw-is, supra note 123, at § 2.1 (Commentary).
205. 479 U.S. 873 (1986) (mem.) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting as to the Court's
denial of the petitioner's writ of certiorari).
Winter 19991
526 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:505
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the jury.20 6 During
the guilt phase of the trial, Mr. Grandison opted to represent himself
with court-appointed standby counsel.2°7 However, after his convic-
tion, Mr. Grandison told the trial court that he wished to terminate his
self-representation. 2 8 He requested, instead, to have his standby
counsel represent him during the sentencing phase.20 9 However, the
trial court denied his request for new counsel.210 In his appeal to the
Maryland Court of Appeals, Mr. Grandison claimed that he was enti-
tled to make a new decision about counsel representation because
capital sentencing constituted a separate trial.21' The Court of Ap-
peals cursorily dismissed his claim. 2
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Mr. Grandison,
Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan dissented and called
for a capital defendant's separate right to counsel at the sentencing
phase. Justice Marshall emphasized that the sentencing phase "is in
all respects a separate trial on the issue of punishment."2 3 In support
of this claim, he noted the Court's decision in Bullington, which held
that the double jeopardy clause applied to the sentencing phase of a
bifurcated trial 4.2 1  He also listed procedural examples which infer
that sentencing is a separate trial: (1) selection of a new jury; (2) evi-
dence is offered; (3) the parties may present argument; (4) the jury is
instructed; and, (5) the jury deliberates and determines the sen-
tence.21 All of these factors are components of a separate trial. As
Justice Marshall stressed, issues regarding "the right to counsel at the
first 'trial' on guilt or innocence should have no more bearing on a
defendant's right to counsel in the sentencing phase than it would on
that defendant's right to counsel in a separate trial on related crimes. '216
Therefore, a capital defendant should be entitled to a separate right to
counsel during sentencing because the sentencing phase is, in itself, a
new trial.
206. See id at 873.
2"M.See id. at 874.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 874-75.
211. See id at 875.
212. See id.
213. d.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Constitutional Values Which Give Rise to the Separate Right to
Counsel
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay2 17
held that the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments applies at all stages of a criminal prosecution where "substantial
rights of a criminal accused may be affected." '218 The Court suggested,
but did not hold, that the sentencing proceeding of a criminal trial is
also guarded by the right to counsel. However, many lower courts
have since concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ap-
plies at sentencing.219
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the right to effective
assistance of counsel applies to "any stage of the prosecution."220 This
holding protects the defendant's assistance of counsel from any gov-
ernmental conduct which may render it ineffective. On the other
hand, Congress has enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3005, which gives a capital
defendant the right to two counsel (though not necessarily two attor-
neys competent in capital cases).221 According to Shepard, the pur-
pose of this legislation was to protect the defendant from his own
counsel's inadvertence or poor judgment. 2 Therefore, a capital de-
fendant's right to assistance of counsel is extremely strong; not only is
it protected from prosecutorial interference, but it is also protected
from the misfeasance of the defendant's own attorney.
Logic dictates that a defendant cannot be deprived of effective
assistance of counsel unless he already has a general constitutional
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, although
Townsend, Mempa, Kirby, and Gardner did not specifically hold that
the right to counsel applies at sentencing, the fact that they hold that
the right to effective assistance of counsel applies at this stage must
imply the former position.2z
If the right to counsel applies equally to both guilt and sentencing
phases, the right should apply separately to the sentencing stage of the
capital trial. As the Supreme Court held in Bullington v. Missouri,224
a sentencing hearing is a separate trial because it is itself "a trial on
the issue of punishment."2" Therefore, the Court held that the
217. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
218. Id at 134.
219. See, e.g., Braun v. Rhay, 416 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Cortez, 6 Cal.
3d 78, 88 (1971); Machwart v. State, 222 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People v.
Fitch 269 N.Y.S.2d 521(N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
220. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967).
221. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
222. See United States v. Shepard, 576 F.2d 719, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1978).
223. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 1202, 1204 (5th Cir. 1997).
224. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
225. Id. at 438.
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double jeopardy clause applies to the sentencing phase of a bifurcated
trial.
2 2 6
Other aspects of the sentencing phase indicate that it is not only a
new trial, but a much different trial. For example, the defendant's
right to present mitigating evidence at sentencing is significantly ex-
panded.227 Evidentiary rulings based upon relevancy and hearsay at
the guilt stage, do not have automatic application to the penalty
stage.228 Finally, a separate "death-qualified" jury may be empanelled
to hear sentencing arguments.2 2 9 Because courts allow a capital de-
fendant to be tried by a separate jury, under the Sixth Amendment at
the sentencing phase, it seems reasonable that the Sixth Amendment
also extends the right to be represented by separate counsel?230 These
components of the sentencing phase further Justice Marshall's opinion
that it is "in all respects a separate trial."'" Even the ABA has de-
clared that "a capital trial is, in substance, two separate trials."
'1 2
Therefore, a defendant's decision regarding his right to counsel at the
guilt phase of a capital trial should under no circumstances bind him
in the sentencing phase. The capital defendant is entitled to have a
separate right to counsel at sentencing and, thus, a separate attorney
represent him under the Sixth Amendment.
C. Due Process and the "Fear Trial"
One may still believe that the sentencing phase is technically not
a separate trial for Sixth Amendment purposes, and that, therefore, a
capital defendant does not have a right to separate counsel at this
phase. However, Justice Sutherland's words in Powell should still ring
clear: "[A capital defendant's right to counsel is] of such a character
that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions." ''  I propose that there are concepts of due
process and fundamental fairness which exist beyond the realm of trial
procedure that give the capital defendant a right to separate counsel
at sentencing under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, the jury's prejudicial feelings of resentment
226. See i&. at 446.
227. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983); New Jersey v.
Monturi, 478 A.2d 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
231. Grandison v. Maryland, 479 U.S. 873,875 (1986) (mem.) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting as to the Court's denial of the petitioner's writ of certiorari).
232. ABA GumDEuns, supra note 123, at § 1.1 (Commentary).
233. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 (1925)).
and doubt toward his counsel require that the capital defendant pos-
sess a right to separate counsel at the sentencing phase.
These prejudices are the result of several fears. First, there is the
jury's fear of the convicted defendant. At the guilt trial, the jury fears
the defendant who has been accused of an atrocious crime-often, the
crime is murder. If the jury convicts, hatred is added to the fear-
hatred of the crime that the defendant now represents and hatred of
the convict himself.
As a result, another kind of hatred falls across the defendant's
advocate. If defense counsel is responsible for controlling the legal
movements of the defendant throughout trial, it is fair to say that the
jury is fully capable of seeing the puppet and looking for the string.
The jury convicted at the guilt stage because they believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the capital offense.
They convicted because they did not believe the defense counsel's
string-pulling arguments of non-culpability. So why should the jury
believe defense counsel now at the sentencing phase? Why should
they even listen to her arguments? To say that the jury will put aside
their prejudices and make an unbiased decision regarding life and
death is to ignore the human condition.
State courts have responded to this "serious possibility of preju-
dice" 4 by empanelling a separate "death-qualified" jury to hear the
sentencing phase." 5 Although conceived out of the best intentions,
this measure does little to combat jury prejudice. The second jury
which hears the sentencing arguments is obviously aware that they are
faced with a convicted murderer, who is also likely to be represented
by the same attorney who was disbelieved by a preceding jury. The
same prejudices regarding hatred for the accused and doubt of his
counselor are not removed by the insertion of a new jury panel.
These fears not only affect the jury, but they also reflect on the
defense counsel's strategy at sentencing. It has already been estab-
lished that many attorneys who represent capital defendants do not
understand the significance of the sentencing trial. They may have
little capital defense experience and be unaware of the procedural and
evidentiary differences that comprise such a trial. If their client is con-
victed, they may not have prepared an adequate strategy for sentenc-
ing. They are aware of the jury's hatred of the defendant, and, instead
of playing to the jury's sympathy, they decide to remain consistent in
the eyes of the jury by appealing to the concept of reasonable doubt.
No mitigating evidence is offered, and, often times, the defendant is
234. Monturi, 478 A.2d at 1268.
235. See, e.g., id. at 1269-70.
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sentenced to die. 6 Johnny Taylor and Daniel Thomas, whose cases
were discussed earlier, are the fatal results of this too familiar
scenario. 7
Finally, there is the defendant's fear. Here is a person who has
committed an atrocious crime-one worthy of having his life taken
away under law. Yet under the Constitution, he is still entitled to a
fair trial and the right to be effectively represented by counsel in his
defense. As Justice Sutherland noted in Powell, the defendant "lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense ....
and requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him." 38 Without the ability to be properly represented at
his sentencing, the defendant will lack the "skill" and "knowledge"
necessary to defend his life to an already prejudiced jury. There can
be no greater fear than to not know how to save your own life.
These fears-those of the jury, defense counsel, and defendant-
deprive a capital defendant of due process at the sentencing phase of
his trial. The Supreme Court has already declared, in Gardner v. Flor-
ida,23 9 that the sentencing phase of a capital trial must comply with
due process.240 Due process applies many of the constitutional guar-
antees found in the Bill of Rights to the states; it also requires that
states honor certain "fundamental rights" outside of those enumer-
ated in the Constitution.24
The right to an impartial jury trial is a fundamental right under
the Sixth Amendment. 42 I insist that the convicted defendant cannot
be guaranteed a fair capital trial unless he is afforded the right to have
a "new face" represent him during the sentencing phase. Without sep-
arate counsel, the defendant is inadequately equipped to deal with the
overwhelming prejudices lined up against him as he tries to avoid a
death sentence. Fundamental fairness dictates that each defendant be
given a fair trial and the right to counsel at this trial. And in capital
trials, where the finality of the punishment is so severe, a defendant
should be given added protections to ensure that the individual re-
ceives a fair hearing both at the guilt and sentencing phases. The stat-
utory right to multiple counsel under section 3005 is not sufficient.
236. See, e.g., Straight v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 674 (l1th Cir. 1985) (no mitigating evi-
dence presented); Dillon v. Duckworth, 751 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1984) (very little mitigating
evidence presented); Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984) (no mitigating evi-
dence presented); Porter v. Raleigh, 478 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1985) (no mitigating evidence
presented).
237. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
238. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
239. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
240. See id. at 358.
241. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Under the statute, only one of the attorneys need be competent in
capital matters.243 The appointment of such counsel is left to the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and, if the defendant does not clearly assert
the statutory right, it is automatically waived.24
The Supreme Court must recognize these weaknesses in the case
and statutory law and declare a right to separate counsel during capi-
tal sentencing under either the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
V. Conclusion
The constitutional right to counsel should provide the separate
right to counsel at the sentencing phase of the capital trial. The
Supreme Court has already made several significant holdings which
step towards recognizing this right. The Court has held that the right
to counsel applies to capital trials and to all critical stages therein (in-
cluding the sentencing phase). It has held that the right to effective
assistance of counsel applies at the sentencing phase of these trials.
And the Court has also found that capital sentencing must comport
with the slippery notion of due process. From these holdings, a right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment at the sentencing phase is
drawn.
From there, it becomes necessary to examine the structure of the
bifurcated trial. Specifically, the procedural and evidentiary compo-
nents that make up the sentencing phase signify that it is, indeed, a
separate trial. In response to these facts, the Court has held that the
double jeopardy clause applies to the capital sentencing "trial."
Therefore, a defendant's decision regarding his right to counsel at the
guilt phase of a capital trial should under no circumstances bind him
in the sentencing phase.
But of equal importance, there are inherent prejudices within the
capital jury which prevent a convicted defendant from being assured
an impartial trial and which deny him due process. These prejudices
are grown out of fear and hatred towards the convict, and they cast a
disbelieving shadow over his attorney's credibility. Although a sepa-
rate right to counsel at sentencing would not relieve all these
prejudices, it is the least protection that the Constitution can provide a
person whose life rests in the hands of strangers. As Justice Harry
Blackmun stressed, "When we execute a capital defendant in this
243. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 198, 200 and accompanying text.
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country, we rely on the belief that the individual was guilty, and was
convicted and sentenced after a fair trial, to justify the imposition of
state-sponsored kiling."245
245. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1264 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun passed away during the production of this Note on March 4, 1999. Dur-
ing his tenure on the Court, Justice Blackmun helped expand and protect the rights of the
criminally accused. In doing so, he was a champion of the individual liberties we all cherish
but often take for granted.
